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This paper shows that the general foreclosure result claimed by Salinger in his 
1988 Q j e  article is incorrect. Extending Salinger’s model, I develop a two- 
stage game form and derive explicit conditions for integrated firms to supply or 
foreclose the intermediate good market. The emergence of either the foreclosure 
or vertical supply equilibrium is endogenous. It depends on the number of 
integrated firms and unintegrated upstream and downstream firms. Foreclosure 
arises in duopoly cases and is also supported by a small number of downstream 
firms and a large number of upstream firms. Vertical supply, on the other hand, 
is admissible for a broad range of parameter values and is supported by a large 
number of downstream firms and a low number of upstream firms. (JEL L22)
*1 thank seminar participants at the Eui and the Department of Economics, University 
College, Swansea, for their valuable comments. I am grateful to Louis Phlips for helpful 
comments; I am particularly indebted to Stephen Martin for his advice and encouragement. 
Editorial support from Barbara Bonke is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are, 






















































































































































































1 In tro d u ctio n
The conduct of vertically integrated firms on intermediate good markets is a 
controversial issue in industrial economics. In am important paper, Michael 
A. Salinger (1988) analyses markets with differing numbers of integrated firms 
and unintegrated upstream and downstream firms. His approach overcomes the 
limitations to equal numbers, mostly two upstream and two downstream firms, 
that characterise other game-theoretic work.1 A major result of Salinger’s paper 
that has found wide consideration in the literature is that vertically integrated 
firms do not participate in the market for the intermediate good, neither as a 
seller nor as a buyer.2 I show that Salinger’s claim that the foreclosure result 
would hold for every conceivable market structure is incorrect. There are market 
structures that are conducive to vertical supply, and others that support vertical 
foreclosure.
I focus on the exclusion of downstream rivals from the integrated firm’s 
input supplies to evaluate the logic of Salinger’s foreclosure claim. I extend 
Salinger’s formal model by making the supply decision endogenous in the first 
stage of a two-stage game and derive an explicit subgame-perfect solution for 
the intermediate good output of the integrated firm. The key result is that 
the existence of either the foreclosure or vertical supply equilibrium depends 
on the number of unintegrated up- and downstream firms and the number of 
vertically integrated producers. This qualifies Salinger’s result as a special case, 
since vertical market foreclosure arises only for a restricted range of parameters.
The analysis is conducted within the following setting:
• successive oligopoly,
• differing numbers of upstream and downstream firms,
• homogeneous goods in both final and intermediate goods markets,
• fixed-coefficient technology, and
• constant-returns to scale in up- and downstream production.
'See Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990) and Bernheim and Whin- 
ston (1991). These papers restrict their attention to two upstream and two downstream firms.
2See Martin (1993) for a recent textbook that thoroughly discusses Salinger’s model. 





























































































The vertical market structure assumes partial integration, with both verti­
cally integrated and unintegrated upstream and downstream firms being present 
in the markets.
The next section revises Salinger’s argumentation and falsifies it with a 
simple example. Furthermore, it is shown that the argument Salinger uses to 
derive his foreclosure claim is fallacious. Section 3 extends Salinger’s model 
and develops the integrated firms’ supply decision. Using backward induction, 
the precise conditions for the emergence of the foreclosure (subsection 3.3) and 
supply equilibrium (subsection 3.4) are derived. Subsection 3.5 provides simu­
lations of the integrated firm’s intermediate good output. Section 4 interprets 
these results, while conclusions are given in section 5.
2 V ertica lly  In teg ra ted  F irm s an d  th e  
In term ed ia te  G ood  M arket: A  R e­
co n sid era tio n
Salinger makes the following assumptions about the conjectures a vertically 
integrated firm makes in assessing the effect of its actions on intermediate and 
final good producers3.
1. (a) If a vertically integrated firm sells an extra unit of the intermediate 
good, it holds a Cournot conjecture with respect to other intermediate good 
producers (integrated and unintegrated) and (b) it conjectures that a(n) 
(unintegrated) final good producer increases its output by one unit.
2. (a) If a vertically integrated firm buys an extra unit of the intermediate 
good, it has a Cournot conjecture towards other final good producers, while 
(b) it conjectures that an (unintegrated) intermediate good producer ex­
pands its output by one unit.
3. The following inequalities hold: c < p < z —m. The first inequality implies 
that the upstream profit margin is positive, and the second inequality, 
z — p — m > 0 implies that unintegrated final good producers earn a 
positive profit.



































































































number of intermediate good producers 
number of final good producers 
number of vertically integrated producers 
number of non-integrated intermediate good 
producers
number of non-integrated final good producers
M  =  (riF,nr,n) vertical market structure 






intermediate good price 
constant upstream average cost 
=constant internal transfer price 
constant unit cost of transforming 
the intermediate into the final good 
quantity of the final good 
quantity of the intermediate good
Note that assumptions 1(a) and 2(a) are Cournot assumptions with regard 
to horizontal competitors. Assumptions 1(b) and 2(b) warrant two further 
remarks. First, as is already expressed by Salinger, given the fixed-coefficients- 
technology and given that agents hold Cournot expectations, they become mere 
consistency requirements. Second, and more important, they are about extra 
units, i.e. marginal changes that leave the intermediate and final good prices 
unchanged.
Salinger claims that, given these three assumptions, a “vertically inte­
grated firm chooses not to participate in the market for the intermediate good”. 
Participation has two sides: buying and selling. I concentrate on the exclusion of 
unintegrated downstream rivals from the integrated firms’ input supplies. This 
implies that “unintegrated final good producers lose a supplier” (Salinger, p. 
345) as a consequence of vertical mergers. Integrated firms do not consider buy­
ing on the intermediate good market as a profitable strategy and are satisfying 
their input demand internally.
To show that for the integrated firms selling on the intermediate good 




























































































... (S)uppose that the firm sells (Q) units4 of the intermediate good. 
Consider reducing sales of the intermediate good to 0 and increasing 
final good production by (Q). By the first assumption, the reduced 
sales of the intermediate good cause final good producers to reduce 
output by (Q). This exactly offsets the vertically integrated firm’s 
increased output of the final good. The market output and, there­
fore, the price of the final good and revenues from inframarginal 
sales are not affected (p 348).
The change in profit is then equal to (z — m)Q — pQ, which by the third 
assumption is positive. Salinger concludes that
(i)t may be surprising that the firm does not sell any of the 
intermediate good even if (p > c). The firm recognizes, however, 
that its sales of the intermediate good ultimately compete with its 
own final goods. Provided that (p) and (2) are such that it makes 
more money from final good sales than from intermediate good sales, 
it should use all of its intermediate good output internally (p. 348).
I show that the preceding scenario is fallacious. The following example 
provides some intuition of the fallacy behind it.
A Numerical Example and Suggested Interpretation
Salinger observes that “sales of the intermediate good by a vertically inte­
grated firm affect its profit from final good sales. Thus, a vertical merger may 
give an intermediate good producer an incentive to restrict its sales of the in­
termediate good” (p. 347). This observation points to a strategic effect of an 
integrated firm’s intermediate good supply decision since it foresees the impact 
of this supply decision on its second stage profit.5 Thus, an integrated firm’s in­
termediate good supply depends on its net marginal revenue from intermediate 
good sales and on the marginal change in its downstream profit function.
Since Salinger implicitly assumes that the foreclosure result applies gen­
erally within the aforementioned setting, a simple example suffices to provide a 
contradiction. Assume the following numerical specification: a — 12, 6 = 1 ,  c =
4A somewhat different notation from Salinger’s is used here. For this reason, the variables 
are bracketed in quotes from the original text.
5See Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) for an 




























































































1 , and m = 1 and let the vertical market structure be (rip, nj, n) =  (10,5,4). 
Salinger’s equations (3a) and (3b) for final good Cournot output then become 
(in my notation), xv =  (4 + 6p) and xu =  yj (15 — 5p), where xv represents
the integrated firm’s output and xu the unintegrated firm’s output. Aggre­
gating unintegrated output yields (rip — n)xu = jj (15 — op). Applying the 
fixed-coefficients technology {tif — n)xu =  Q and solving for p gives the in­
verse derived demand function p = 3 — | o n  which the upstream firms’ 
marginal revenue is based. It is now explicitly allowed for integrated firms to 
sell a positive amount on the intermediate good market. Expressing the inte­
grated firm’s equilibrium profit from its downstream operations in terms of Q 
yields ^  (Q — 10)2. The integrated upstream firm’s profit function incorporates 
this strategic term as well as direct profit (total revenue minus total cost). To 
derive the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, note that there is only one unintegrated 
upstream firm (n/ — n) =  5 — 4 = 1 ,  called firm “5”, and that the four integrated 
firms are symmetric in their behaviour. The integrated firms profit as of stage 
1 is 11” =  (p — c)qv +  ^  (Q — 10)2. The intermediate good Cournot quantities 
are q5 — | | |  for the unintegrated upstream producer (=firm number 5) and 
qv = ||2  > 0 for any of the four integrated firms. The integrated firms each 
supply a positive amount of the intermediate good to the market, and the total 
integrated output nqv =  ~  comes near to total unintegrated output. I want 
to point out, however, that the result of positive intermediate good sales by 
integrated firms does not depend on the specific specification chosen but holds 
for a broad range of parameter values.
This simple example suggests that the claim that in general integrated 
firms fully foreclose their independent downstream rivals from their interme­
diate good supply must be wrong. The fallacy that lies behind this incorrect 
claim is that different equilibrium points of the same game are compared, one 
of which cannot be a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Assume, as does Salinger, 
that “unintegrated upstream producers move first and that the final good ... 
producers move second” (p. 349). Furthermore, assume that for a given market 
structure, a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium exists. Now suppose that the 
integrated firms’ best responses to the other integrated and unintegrated firms’ 
best responses is to restrict the intermediate good output to zero. By the defi­
nition of a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally 
from its Nash strategy. Hence, foreclosure is the best an integrated firm can 
do under these circumstances and any comparison intended to find out whether 
the foreclosure outcome will be preferred or rejected to an imaginary outcome 




























































































vertical supply is preferred by the integrated firm if this is the Nash equilib­
rium strategy for each integrated firm in intermediate good market competition. 
Salinger’s fallacy was to assume ad hoc that foreclosure is preferred to vertical 
supply in the first stage of the game, and then to prove it. In the remainder of 
the paper, the supply decision of a vertically integrated firm is derived within a 
more general framework by an extension of the model Salinger uses in his paper. 
The solution concept used is subgame-perfectness and it is found by backward 
induction.
3 M ark et F oreclosure: A  T w o -S ta g e  
G am e Form
3.1 T he Second—Stage (D ow nstream ) Equilibrium : The 
Salinger M odel
Our discussion of the equilibrium in the downstream industry reproduces Salin­
ger’s equations. The profit of the first integrated producer is6
II1 =  (a — c — m — b X )x x, (1)
where X  = x 1 + ... +  xn + xn+l +  ... + xnr denotes total downstream output. 
The first-order condition for profit maximisation of (1) is
2a:1 + X -1 =  (a — c — m) /b, (2)
where X ~ l is the final good output of the downstream industry except firm 1. 
The profit of the first unintegrated firm is given by
r r +1 =  (a -  p -  m -  b X )xn+1. (3)
Comparing (1) and (3) reveals an important difference in the two firms’ opti­
misation problems: The integrated firm’s downstream unit pays c to obtain a 
unit of the intermediate input Q (which is transformed at cost m  into output 
X). The unintegrated firm must pay the market price p to purchase a unit of 
Q, where this price is subject to oligopolistic manipulation by the integrated 
rivals. The first-order condition for profit maximisation of (3) is
2xn+1 +  X -(n+1) = ( a - p - m ) / b .  (4)
6The fact that the first integrated firm is considered has no special meaning. It is just a 




























































































Imposing symmetry such that a;1 =  ... =  xn = xv and xn+1 = ... =  x Nf = xu, 
the ’’condensed” first-order conditions are
(n + l)x” + (tif -  n)xu = (a — c — m) /b (5)
and
(tif — n — l)xu +  nxv = ( a - p  — m) /b. (6)
Following Salinger, Cournot competition is assumed. The Cournot-Nash equi­




(a — c — m) + (rip — n)(p — c) 
b(nF +1)
(a — c — m) — (n + l)(p — c)
(7)
(8)b (tif +  1)
Equilibrium quantities (7) and (8) are written as functions of N  and p to express 
their dependence on the intermediate good price and N  = (n, nF) , the vector 
of the number of integrated and unintegrated firms in the downstream industry.
Comparative Statics Consider an increase in p. The comparative stat­
ics effect is positive for the output of an integrated firm, ^  > 0, and
negative for an unintegrated firm, ^  =  — j^ T i)  < O-^his asymmetry pro­
vides an integrated firm with an incentive to foreclose its intermediate good 
supply: By reducing its intermediate good supply, possibly to zero, it increases 
the intermediate good price p and the costs of an unintegrated rival. Total 
downstream output is given by
X (N ,p ) =  (tif — ri)xu(n,p) + n xv(n,p)
=  b(riF +  1) Ka ~ 171 ~ p>)rlF + &  -  CM ' (9)
One central argument in Salinger’s original paper is that the final good 
market output (and the price) is not affected by an integrated firm’s action in the 
intermediate good market. If an integrated firm reduces, say, its intermediate 
good sales, the balance of supply and demand and thus the intermediate good 
price is affected. Partially differentiating X(n,p) with respect to p shows
dX(N ,p) _  (n p - n )





























































































Since tif — n > 0, the derivative is negative, and an increase in p reduces the 
input demand of the unintegrated final good producers more than it raises the 
output of the integrated firms. Equation (10) gives further evidence that the 
scenario discusses above was ill-constructed.7
Total unintegrated downstream output is given by X u(N,p) =  (np — n)xu. 
Solving this expression for p using the fixed-coefficients technology X u(N,p) = 
Q(N,p), one obtains the inverse derived demand function for the intermediate 
good
(a — c — m)/b — nF——Q • (11)p = c +
b
n + 1 tif — n
3.2 T he First (U pstream ) Stage
Now suppose that, in perfect accordance with Salinger’s argumentation, in­
tegrated firms foreclose independent upstream rivals from their purchases for 
integrated downstream requirements. I enlarge the strategy space of integrated 
firm in an natural way: They are allowed to enter into trading relationships 
with n p —n unintegrated downstream firms by selling strictly positive amounts 
of their intermediate good output. Thereby, the integrated firms play a Cournot 
game in the upstream industry with integrated and unintegrated competitors. 
Foreclosure, however, remains possible since an integrated firm can always 
choose to sell nothing of its output on the intermediate good market.8
7One might object that no price change will take place at all in the intermediate good 
market, since a final good producer logically must absorb the extra sales of the integrated 
firm. This argument, however, neglects the sequential nature of the moves of both firms. 
Only if they were acting simultaneously could any price change be potentially cancelled out. 
This cannot, however, be the case in a model with sequential moves, where the final good 
producers’ input demand is forwarded to the market only after the intermediate good market 
has reached its equilibrium.
sHart and Tirole (1990) argue that “(a) strategy that Salinger’s upstream Cournot assump­
tion does not permit is for an integrated supplier to undercut its nonintegrated rivals slightly, 
so that nonintegrated purchasers buy the same amount as before but now buy from the in­
tegrated supplier. Yet a price-cutting strategy seems natural, particularly in the context of 
many trading relationships between upstream and downstream firms that are personalized...” 
(Fn 50, p. 258). Within the framework of homogeneous goods, price-setting leads to the 
implausible competitive equilibrium outcome. It seems thus more “natural” to extend the 
model by allowing integrated firms to “oversupply” the market, compared with their supply 





























































































The Unintegrated Firm’s Problem Consider the profit of the first 
unintegrated upstream firm,
n n+1(N ,P) = n + 1
• m uf + 1
Q nn+1 ( 12)b np — n
where p(Q) is given by (11) and where Q = n qv + qn+1 + ... +  qn‘ denotes total 
intermediate good output by the upstream industry. The first and second-order 
conditions for the maximisation of (12) are
(nF +  1) (2qn+1 +  Q-<"+1))
(n +  1)
a — c — m
uf — n 0,
- 2  b(nF + 1) 




In the first-order-condition (13) the term Q-(n+1) represents the interme­
diate good quantities of the unintegrated upstream firms other than the first 
n +  l ’s firm, as well as the outputs of the n integrated firms.
The Integrated Firm’s Problem Turning now to the first-stage op­
timisation problem of the first integrated firm, recall the existence of a strategic 
effect that affects first-stage optimisation. Thus, the profit function is
i m p )  =  m ax{0, -±î [ a ^ - ^ ± i Q ] 91} +
[(a — c — m) — b((riF — ri)xu(n,p) + n xv(n,p))]xl(n,p),
(15)
where the first term on the right-hand side of (15) gives the profit of (poten­
tially) selling the intermediate good to the unintegrated downstream firms, and 
the second term represents the equilibrium profit of the first integrated firm’s 
downstream operations. After substituting (11) in the expressions in (15), the 
profit expression becomes
U \N ,p ) = max 
+
{° .
H Q - ( a - c - m ))]2
6(n+l)2
(16)
The first integrated firm maximises (16) subject to the non-negativity con­
straint q1 > 0. Depending on the sign of ql , a corner and an interior solution 




tif + 1 
tif -  n
(2g1 + Q -1)]
2
(n + l )2




























































































where Q~l represents intermediate good output other than that of firm 1. The 
second order condition is 26 (n nF + 2n + 1) /  ((n + l )2 (n — n^)) < 0 since 
tif — n > 0. Since integrated and unintegrated upstream firms are alike, as­
suming symmetry: q1 =  ... =  qn =  qv and <jn+1 =  ... =  qN' = \ then
Q~' =  (n — l)qv +  (tii — n)q“, where <f denotes the symmetric output of the 
unintegrated firms and qv denotes the symmetric output of integrated firms. 
This leads to
(n  +  i )
a — c — m  jv  +  l
nF
1  ((n + 1 )qv +  (n/ -  n) 9")]
(n + 1  y [a — c — m — b (nqv +  (n/ — n) ç")] < 0. (18)
The first term in (18) represents net marginal revenue from selling intermediate 
good output on the market. The second term with a negative sign represents 
the strategic effect that was mentioned earlier.9 The following two possible 




The corner solution is equivalent to the foreclosure equilibrium. The in­
terior solution will be referred to as a vertical supply equilibrium.
3.3 T he Foreclosure Equilibrium
The conditions for a foreclosure equilibrium imply that qv = qF = 0 in (18),
tif + 1
(n  +  1)
a — c — m
tif — n ((n1 -  n) qF)
<
(n + 1)5 [a — c — m — b ((jij — n) <$)]. (19)
Rewriting (19) yields a condition for the unintegrated upstream firm’s output 
qf,< that must be satisfied in a foreclosure equilibrium
9f >
(n — l)(riF — n)
(ni -  n) [n/r(n — 1) +  3n +  1] '
(20)
9The negative sign corresponds to Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer’s (1985) analysis 




























































































At the foreclosure equilibrium, the reaction function of the unintegrated 
firm is given by (13) with nqv =  0 and Q“(n+1) =  (n/ — n — 1) q%. The symmet­
ric Cournot-Nash output is
# {M )
(a — c — m) (n/r — n)
b (nF +  1) (n/ -  n +  1) ’
(21)
where M  denotes the vector M  =  (np,n/ ,n). Inserting the total unintegrated 
equilibrium output (n/ — n) q% into (11) yields the perfect equilibrium interme­
diate good price
Pf (M)  = c +  •
m
(in + 1) (n / -  n  +  1) ’ 
that corresponds to Salinger’s equation (5).
(22)
Substituting q'p in (20) with the Cournot output q'piM) in (21),
(nF -  n) (n -  1 )(nF -  n)
(tif + 1) (n/ — n + 1) — (n/ — n) [ni?(n — 1) +  3n + 1]
(23)
gives after some manipulations the condition that must be satisfied for the 
foreclosure equilibrium to be admissible:
_______________ (nF ~ n) ( - 7 )_______________ >Q
(rip + 1) (rif (n — 1) + 3n + 1) (m -  n) (nr -  n + 1) “  ’
where
7  =  (n (np — 2ni + 2n +  3) — 2m — nF -  1) ■
(24)
Since the denominator of (24) and nF — n are positive, the foreclosure equilib­
rium is admissible for values of 7  < 0. The term 7 , however, depends only on 
M. Hence, the emergence of foreclosure is endogenous. For 7  > 0, condition 
(24) is violated and the supply equilibrium becomes admissible.
3.4 T he Supply Equilibrium
In addition to the condition 7  > 0, further insights into the nature of the 
supply equilibrium can be gained by explicitly solving for the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium in the upstream industry. Since now qv = qvs > 0, the first-order 
condition (17) must be equal to zero. The condensed reaction functions of the 
unintegrated and integrated firms can now be solved for the supply equilibrium 




























































































where 7  = n (np -  2n/ +  2n +  3) — 2n/ — uf — 1 was already defined above, and 
A =  n (nr nF +  nj + 2n + 1) + nF (ni -  n +  1) +  rt/ +  1. For the unintegrated 
producer,
= (a ~ c — m) (n +  1) (nF -  n) (nF + 2n +  1) ^
Since A > 0, (26) is strictly positive. According to (25), the integrated firm 
produces a strictly positive output if 7  > 0, which corresponds to the condition 
derived in (24). The vertical supply equilibrium exists if 7  > 0, and since then 
—7  < 0, both equilibrium constellations are mutually exclusive.
3.5 W hen  is th e  Supply Equilibrium  A dm issible?
This section discusses the conditions that produce 7  > 0 or 95 (M) > 0 in terms 
of relevant parameter values. Due to the partial integration assumption, the 
following restriction is placed upon M  :
n < min {n/ — 1 , uf — 1} •
Consider first the duopoly cases. If the upstream industry is a duopoly, n/ =  2 
and n = 1. For this combination, 7  = —4, independent of the magnitude of 
uf- Now suppose that the downstream industry is duopolistic with n̂ - =  2 and 
n — 1. Then, 7  = 4 — 4n/ < 0 for nr > 1. For the duopoly cases, foreclosure is 
the resultant equilibrium.
Moving beyond duopoly, the existence of a supply equilibrium depends 
upon the number of integrated and unintegrated firms in final and intermediate 
good markets (M). An analytical characterisation is not possible. Table 1 
display qs{M) as computed in (25) as a function of n and uf for a fixed value 
of n/ = 5.
Bold faced entries in Table 1 give values of q$ > O.10 These results show 
that the vertical supply equilibrium exists for a considerable range of parameter 
values. For small numbers of downstream firms, i.e. rip < 4, the equilibrium 
outcome is foreclosure. This leads to the presumption that if there are only a 
few downstream competitors, the foreclosure equilibrium is supported. Once 
a level of Uf = 5 is reached, vertical supply becomes the equilibrium outcome 
if n is large, relative to its maximum of 4. In Table 1, n =  4 ensures vertical
10Altematively, 7 could have been tabulated. The conditions for the existence of either 




























































































nF /  n 1 2 3 4
3 0 0 - -
4 0 0 0 -
5 0 0 0 s/(129)
6 0 0 0 lls/(679)
8 0 0 5s/(837) 2s/(63)
10 0 0 7s/(407) 23s/(517)
12 0 0 15s/(559) 116s/(2119)
14 0 0 lls/(315) 78/(111)
16 0 0 39s/(935) 82s/(1173)
18 0 8s/(2641) 55s/(1159) 329s/(4351)
20 0 221s/(4221) 424s/(5271)
30 0 182s/(6913) 207s/(3007) 1079s/(11191)
40 0 437s/(12013) 407s/(5207) 678s/(6437)
50 0 8s/(187) 2021s/(24021) 3289s/(29631)
Table 1: Values of q” for ri[ = 5; s = g-° m
supply for nF > 5 and n =  3 is compatible with a supply equilibrium if nF 
lies between 8 andl6. For nF € [18,50], the “supply- inducing" n eventually 
reduces to 2. Even with a relatively low proportion of integrated firms in the 
downstream industry, vertical supply arises as the equilibrium if there are many 
nonintegrated downstream rivals.
For most combinations of numbers of upstream and downstream firms, a 
vertical supply equilibrium results once a critical number of integrated firms is 
reached. These critical numbers are tabulated in Table 2. To isolate the effects 
of variations of the three elements in M, consider the effect of a change in np 
first. According to Table 2, perhaps the most general statement one can make 
is that vertical supply arises if the number of downstream firms nF is large, 
n is at least 2 and there are only a few upstream firms n/. For intermediate 
values of rip, 10 say, vertical supply arises only if, first, the number of upstream 
firms is not “too large” (nr < 10), and, second, the proportion of integrated 
firms relative to total upstream firms, is greater than 1/2. Looking at m , 


































































































- — — —
5 - n = 3 n = 4 - - - -
6 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 - - - -
8 n = 2 n = 3 n = 3 n = 7 - - -
10 n = 2 n = 3 n = 3 n = 7 - - -
12 n = 2 n = 2 n = 3 n = 6 n = 10 - -
14 n = 2 n = 2 n = 3 n . 6 n =  10 - -
16 n = 2 n = 2 n = 3 n = 5 n = 9 n =  13 -
18 n = 2 n = 2 n = 2 n = 5 n =  8 n = 12 -
20 n = 2 n = 2 n = 2 n = 4 n — 8 n = 12 -
30 n = 2 n = 2 n = 2 n = 3 n = 5 n — 8 -
40 n = 2 n = 2 n = 2 n = 3 n =  4 n = 6 n =  32
50 n = 2 n = 2 n = 2 n = 2 n = 3 n = 5 7i = 28
Table 2: Critical values for n that ensure vertical supply
4 In terp reta tio n  o f  th e  R e su lts
In duopoly, either up-or downstream or in both industries simultaneously, ver­
tical foreclosure is the equilibrium.11 This setting is conducive to the “use” of 
foreclosure as a tool to effectively “raise rival’s cost” (Salop and Scheffman 1983, 
1987) through the increase in the intermediate good price p following the fore­
closure decision that asymmetrically affects integrated and unintegrated down­
stream firms. With M =  (2,2,1), the integrated firm can now disadvantage its 
downstream rival by foreclosing its own intermediate good production and thus 
forcing it to rely on the remaining upstream monopolist (see also Perry 1989).
For the oligopoly case, the strategic incentive to raise rival’s cost is mod­
ified by different combinations of M. The incentive to foreclose depends, other 
things kept constant, on the extent of the reallocation of final good output from 
nonintegrated to integrated producers induced by an increase in p. The strength 
of this effect is affected by the number of competitors in the downstream indus­
try. If there are many competitors, the strategic effect of a foreclosure decision
u This suggests that the duopoly case is rather special in a linear framework. Nevertheless, 





























































































is weak: From the comparative statics results of section 3, ^  •
Then, < ^§H . For the limiting case when the downstreamI °P  inf?large I °P  Inf-smaii
industry approaches perfect competition, i.e. when the number of downstream 
firm goes to infinity,
limnp—HX <f(M) =
a — c — m n — 1
n(n/ -  1) +71/ +  1 > 0 for n > 1.
(27)
Perfect competition eliminates the strategic effect. As a consequence, vertical 
supply becomes the equilibrium strategy, save for the case of upstream duopoly 
(ni =  2 and n = 1) discussed above.
The incentive to trade on the intermediate good market depends on the 
profitability of selling positive quantities of Q. This in turn depends on the 
number of upstream firms. If nj is large, net marginal revenue from intermediate 




qv{M) = max a — c — m 2(np — n)(n + 1) 1 
b (nF + l)2(n + 1) J
=  0 . (28)
If the intermediate good becomes perfectly competitive, vertical foreclosure 
arises as the equilibrium, irrespective of rip and n.
For constant nr and uf, a variation of n has a dual effect. Integrated firms 
make their supply decisions simultaneously. If the ratio ^  is laxge, a large share 
of intermediate good supply is potentially foreclosed with an accordingly strong 
upward impact on p. This effect works in favour of foreclosure. On the other 
hand, a large n implies a large ratio ^  in the downstream industry. If ^  is 
large, the gains from the output-restrictive effect of an increase in p are spread 
over a large number of integrated firms and are small for any single firm. From 
the results from section 3, • This effect tends to favourIn large In  sm all
vertical supply.
5 C on clu sion
In this paper I reexamine the claim made by Salinger in his 1988 Q j e  paper 
that in a successive oligopoly framework with homogeneous goods and fixed co­
efficients, vertically integrated firms generally foreclose the intermediate good 
market. Focusing on the exclusion of unintegrated downstream competitors 




























































































that the foreclosure claim is incorrect as a general result and holds for special 
cases only. A simple example suffices to illustrate that it is profitable for inte­
grated firms to trade on the intermediate good market if the market structure 
supports vertical supply. Viewed from the perspective of a two-stage game, 
the argument Salinger uses to derive the foreclosure results is identified as an 
implicit ad-hoc assumption: foreclosure is always preferred to vertical supply in 
the first-stage of the game. Section 3 of this paper derives the precise conditions 
for vertical foreclosure versus vertical supply to arise as a perfect Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium by explicitly allowing integrated firms to trade on the intermediate 
good market. The emergence of either of the two mutually exclusive equilibria is 
endogenous. It depends on the number of integrated firms and of unintegrated 
upstream and downstream firms. Foreclosure arises if the upstream as well as 
downstream industry is duopolistic. Moreover, a small number of downstream 
firms and a large number of upstream firms is favourable to foreclosure. Ver­
tical supply, on the other hand, is admissible for a broad range of parameter 
values. A large number of downstream firms and a low number of upstream 
firms supports the vertical supply equilibrium.
In the light of these results, the widespread reception of Salinger’s result 
in the vertical integration literature warrants a reexamination of those papers 
that model vertical mergers within an oligopoly framework.
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